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Abstract—The management and protection of these SCADA 
systems must constantly evolve towards integrated decision 
making and policy driven by cyber security requirements. The 
current research stream in this domain aims, accordingly, to 
foster the smartness of the field equipment which exist through 
the generic concept of SCADA management and operation. 
Those components are governed by policies which depend on 
the components roles, as well as on the evolution of the crisis 
which also confer to the latter the latitude to react based on 
their own perception of the crisis evolution. Their latitude is 
calculated based on the component smartness and is strongly 
determined by, and depending on, the cyber safety of the 
component environment. Existing work related to crisis 
management tends to consider that components evolve and are 
organized in systems but as far as we know, no systemic 
solution exists which integrates all of the above requirements. 
This paper proposes an innovative version of ArchiMate® for 
the SCADA components modelling purpose to enrich their 
collaborations and, more particularly, the description of their 
behavior endorsed in the cyber-policy. Our work has been 
illustrated in the frame of a critical infrastructure in the field 
of petroleum supply and storage networks. 
Keywords- ArchiMate; metamodel; SCADA; multi-
components system; trust; petroleum supply chains: critical 
infrastructure. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Up to now, components represented at the business layers 
[1][2][7][8] have been considered human actors playing 
business roles. However, rising security requirements for the 
management of heterogeneous and distributed architectures 
calls for a rethinking of distribution of the security 
procedures in both: human and software autonomous 
entities. Although having been handled by human employees 
for years, the management of complex systems, nowadays, 
needs to be shared with intelligent software items, often 
perceived being more adapted to act in critical situations.  
This statement is enforced by the characteristic ability of 
the component to act autonomously in open, distributed and 
heterogeneous environments, in connection or not with an 
upper authority. Acknowledging this situation, we are forced 
to admit that SCADA [4][39] components are no longer to 
be considered only as basic isolated solution deployed to 
support business activities, but that they are part of crisis 
reaction strategy [29]. Since then, acquiring an innovative 
enterprise architecture framework to represent the behaviors 
of such components appears fully justified in view of the 
arising cyber protection principles and required by the 
practitioners, especially the ones engaged in the management 
of those critical infrastructures security protection.  
In this paper, we propose to explore ArchiMate® and to 
redesign its structure in order to fit with component software 
actors’ specificities and domain constraints. The main focus 
concerns the design and the consideration of the policies that 
are centric concepts related to the activation of component’s 
behaviors. All along the modeling of the SCADA system and 
the definition of the policies according to these models, we 
are going to illustrate the theory with a case study related to 
the petroleum supply chain, and more specially the specific 
functions of Crude Oil Supply and Crude Oil Storage and 
Distribution. This extended case is introduced in Section 2. 
In Section 3, we will review the SCADA components 
metamodel and the SCADA layers for crisis management 
and we will model the concept of policy [22][24] that 
represents the engine of the component modeling framework 
in Section 4. Section 5 provides related works and Section 6 
concludes the paper.  
II. RELATED WORKS 
Literatures explain methodologies to model Multi-
Agent System (MAS) and their environments as a one layer 
model and give complete solutions or frameworks. Gaia [1] 
is a framework for the development of agent architectures 
based on a lifecycle approach (requirements, analysis, 
conceptualization and implementation). AUML [6] and 
MAS-ML [2] are extensions of the UML language for the 
modelling of MAS but do no longer exist following the 
release by the OMG of UML 2.0 [11][12] supporting MAS. 
Prometheus [7] defines a metamodel of the application layer 
and allows generating organizational diagrams, roles 
diagrams, classes’ diagrams, sequences diagrams and so 
forth. It permits to generate codes but does not provide links 
between diagrams and therefore makes it difficult to use for 
alignment purposes or with other languages (e.g., MOF [3], 
DSML4MAS [5]). CARBA [15] provides a dynamic 
architecture for MAS similar to the middleware CORBA 
based on the role played by the agent. Globally, we observe 
that these solutions aim at modelling the application layer of 
MAS. CARBA goes one step further introduces the concept 
of Interface and Service. This approach is closed to the 
solution based on ArchiMate® that we design in our 
proposal but offers less modelling features. As we have 
noticed that agent systems are organized in a way close to 
the enterprises system, our proposal analyses how an 
enterprise architecture model may be slightly reworked and 
adapted for MAS. Therefore, we exploit ArchiMate®, 
which has the following advantages to be supported by The 
Open Group. It has a large community and proposes a 
uniform structure to model enterprise architecture. Another 
advantage of ArchiMate® is that it uses referenced existing 
modelling languages like UML. 
III. COMPLEX OIL DISTRIBUTION TEST MODELING 
To represent the modelling of SCADA components 
metamodel and policy generation, we are going to illustrate 
this paper with the reference case study presented in [24]. 
The crude oil distribution [22] presented at the Section 2 
includes both the oil supply and product distribution 
SCADA systems. Interconnection amongst Remote 
Terminal Unit (RTU) [31] of those SCADA is achieved 
using MTU [30]. The acronym MTU stands for Master 
Terminal Unit and its main purpose is to accept the different 
inputs from the remotely connected devices and to transmit 
these inputs over the rest of the network. Using the 
ArchiMate® for SCADA system theory introduced in 
previous Sections, the SCADA RTU of the crude oil 
distribution SCADA from the distributed plants may be 
modeled as illustrated on Figure 1. 
As illustrated in this figure, both layers of the RTU are 
represented, the COS SCADA RTU Networks Organization 
(RTU-COSNO) and the COSSCADA RTU Networks 
Application (RTU-COSNA). At the COSNO layer, the 
crude oil network SCADA is composed of Crude oil 
portfolio that is assigned to Call for IN (aka Organizational 
alert IN), of application RTU monitoring services (e.g., 
Moni SEGUA and Moni SEBAT (Figure 1)), of RT 
information that impacts the generation of RTU behavioral 
policies. On the other side, the SEGUA and the SEBAT 
RTU (for instance) are represented as actor of the RTU 
organization and are composed of RTU network console 
dedicated to the SCADA management [38]. Both later are 
associated to the artifact modelled by the orange box that 
correspond to a collaboration between both SCADA 
functions, the crude oil supply and the product storage and 
product distribution. At the COSNA layer, four 
RTU/technical layer are modelled, respectively the SEGUA, 
SEBAT, RPBS and REVAP. The structure of this 
RTU/Technical layer is naturally always quite the same and 
is composed of the technical monitoring service 
(corresponding to the core of the RTU such as commonly 
addressed by the literature [21]), and of the interface named 
“in-[RTU/network location]”, which aims at connection the 
monitoring service with the RTU application itself. As 
illustrated at the level of the SEBAT model, the RTU 
application is potentially connected with the others RTU’s 
applications artefacts (cf. two-ring symbol). As summary, in 
this Section we have presented a metamodel for SCADA 
systems. This metamodel allows representing all the 
components of the SCADA following three layers: the 
organization, the application and the technical layers. Those 
models offer the advantages to easily figure out the structure 
of the concepts and their interconnections and thereby, to 
easily capture the interconnection between the components 
within a SCADA and among two or many SCADA’s or 
SCADA functions. Given those advantages, the next 
Section explains how management policies may be designed 
and defined according to instance of this SCADA 
metamodel. Concretely, the usage of the metamodel has 
been illustrated trough a crude oil supply and distribution 
plan SCADA and connections have been depicted among 
the crude oil supply and the crude oil storage and 
distribution function of the SCADA system. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Crude oil SCADA MTU-RTU instance. 
IV. SCADA POLICY MANAGEMENT 
Based on ArchiMate® SCADA metamodel presented in 
Section 3 and illustrated by the Crude Oil Supply SCADA, 
this Section introduces the artefact of policy model by 
ArchiMate. Two types of Policy are depicted: the Cognitive 
and the Permissive [12]. 
A. Policy family 
At the Organizational Layer, Policy can be represented as 
an UML Use Case [11] where concepts of Roles represent 
the Actors which have Responsibilities in the Use Case, 
and the Collaboration concepts show the connections 
between them. Concepts of Products, Value and 
Organizational Service provide the Goal of the Use Case. 
Pre- and Post-conditions model the context of the Use 
Case and are symbolized in the metamodel by the Event 
concept (pre-condition) and the Organizational Object 
(pre-/post-condition). In the Application Layer, 
Application Policy is defined as the realization of 
Responsibilities by the Application Domain in a 
configuration of the Data Domain. UML provides support 
for modelling the behavior performed by the Application 
Domain as Sequence Diagram. Configuration of the Data 
Domain can be expressed as Pre-conditions of the Sequence 
Diagram and symbolized by the execution of a test-method 
on the lifeline of the diagram. The metamodel designed in 
Section 3 has allowed providing the SCADA operators and 
managers with a holistic and integrated view of the SCADA 
architecture building blocks. In practice and to have policy 
extracted according to the metamodel concepts 
interconnections, this SCADA metamodel firstly needs to be 
instantiated for each architecture components. This step is 
achieved by shaping the component according to the three 
abstractions typically advocated by the enterprise 
architecture paradigm [11][12] and [13]. This allows 
discovering the building artefacts of the components as well 
as the connections amongst the components artefacts. An 
example of this instantiation is represented in Figure 1. The 
representation of each component implies paramount 
outcomes for the SCADA [31] operator since it confers to 
the latter a global functional insight of each component 
irrespective of any implementation or vendors’ influence. 
The unitary SCADA [28] component models are than used 
in the second step to picture out the global structure of the 
SCADA architecture and of the connections, in terms of 
policies, amongst the components of the architecture. 
Previous works [40] highlights the two families of policies 
recovered in SCADA [29]: Permissive policies and 
Cognitive policies. Cognitive Policies (CP) [12] represent 
policies which govern the behavior of one artefact of the 
component architecture. This policy specifies the rule that 
the Responsible artefact needs to follow to execute a defined 
activity in a specific context. This rule is dictated by the 
artefact which exists in the same component or in another 
one. The artefact which generates the policy is the Master 
and the one, which execute it is the Slave. The Cognitive 
Policy morphology is articulated on the following set of 
attributes (perceived by [13]): Master artefact, Slave 
artefact, Master component, Slave component, Behaving 
rule, Trigger item, Usage context, Priority extension.  
The application schema of a CP, as presented in Figure 
1, obeys the two following controls: (1) the communication 
path is from a Master structural concept to a Slave 
behavioral concept or (2) the communication path is from a 
Master behavioral artefact to another Slave behavioral 
artefacts. Figure 2. They represent policies which govern the 
knowledge acquisition rules from the Master to the Slave 
artefact [14]. This knowledge acquisition traditionally takes 
the form of SCADA states data accessed or provided in 
order to provide the Responsible with the access (of in, 
out, in_out types [16]) to successive Cognitive Policies 
in case of occurring events. The Permissive Policies 
morphology is articulated on the following set of attributes 
[(perceived by [15]): Master artefact, Slave artefact, Master 
component, Slave component, Permission rules, Pre-
permission conditions, Master permission cardinality, Slave 
permission cardinality, and Cognitive constraints - sustained 
by Cognitive Policy. The application schema of a CP, as 
highlighted in Figure 1, obeys the two following controls: 
(1) the communication path is from a Master structural 
artefact to a Slave informational artefact or (2) the 
communication path is from a Master behavioral artefact to 
a Slave informational artefact. 
B. Policy identification method 
Designing automatic management strategy requires a 
rigorous two phase’s policy elaboration mechanism, 
respectively the policy scheme identification and the policy 
scheme formalization. 
1) Policy scheme identification step 
The first step is itself structured in three phases. The first 
one aims at identifying the structure of the CI architecture in 
terms of unitary modules (components), including their 
three layers of abstraction build upon the SCADA [27] 
metamodel (i.e.,, organization, application, and technical). 
The second phase aims at identifying the external 
parameters of the CI (Critical Infrastructure) such as 
potential threat probes and indicators that may impact the CI 
normal functioning (flood, hijacking, etc.), the physical 
environment, and/or the contractual SLA (service level 
agreement). The third phase aims at identifying the reaction 
policies which may be of two types: Cognitive (artefact of a 
CI component which needs information from succeeding 
artefacts –Figure 2) or Permissive (artefact of a CI 
component which needs permission upon the succeeding 
lower layer artefacts – Red connections on Figure 1). Both 
types of policies are explained in [35][36][37][20]. 
2) Policy scheme formalization step 
After policies being identified, the second step of the 
method aims at formalizing policy scheme using a three 
phases approach. The first one aims at depicting the Master-
Slave communication artefacts (organization-organization, 
organization-technical, and technical-technical), the second 
aims at identifying the cognitive and permissive behaviour 
based on the automatic reaction strategy, and the last one 
aims at formalizing the policies accordingly. This latter is 
function of the policy type and is achieved, on one hand, 
with the inter-artefacts knowledge requirement, external 
probes and monitoring tools in case of cognitive policy and 
with the reaction strategy with the requirement of access to 
artefacts in case of permissive policy. 
3) Inter Critical Infrastructures Study Case 
This second part of the case study aims at defining cognitive 
and permissive security policies supported by the MTU-
RTU model from Figure 1. In [32], authors argue that 
SCADA system network is different from general network 
environment due to its operational environment in national 
infrastructure. Therefore, in such a context, the SCADA 
system needs important broadcast capability, which must be 
highly protected. Among these protection mechanisms are 
the key management schemes [32][33][34] that also have to 
support the multicasting messages protection. Figure 1 
illustrates the modelling of permissive and cognitive policies 
related to the Key Management Exchange, such as 
expressed by [32] among the MTU dedicated to the crude 
oil supply function and the RTU from this function and from 
the storage and distribution function. This field has already 
been tackled by many researches such as [33] [34]. [32] has 
been preferred for this case illustration provided that it 
reduces consistently the number of keys to be stored and 
provides multicasting and broadcasting communication for 
efficient and stable operation of SCADA systems. Hence, 
the policies dedicated to the management of this 
broadcasting will be defined in the following.  
Three constraints related to the key management 
broadcasting mechanism related to the SCADA architecture 
have been defined by [18][19][31] and need to be 
considered along the modelling of the policies: (1) the 
computational capacity limit which may be represented as 
an artefact of a type data object at the application layer of 
the MTU, (2) the low data transmission rate which is also a 
concept related to the MTU by means of a data object, and 
(3) the real-time processing that needs to be consider to 
prevent data processing delay and which may be represented 
as a data object from the RTUs structures. From Figure 2, 
we observe the following list of policies: Firstly at the 
organization layer: the MTU Management policy (1), and 
secondly at the application layer: the crude oil supply policy 
/MTU S1 (2) and /RTU S1 (3) and the crude oil storage 
/RTU Sto1 (4). (1) is existing at the organizational layer 
and is realized by (2) at the technical layer [17]. This first 
family of policies (1) accesses the key exchange 
value that represents the real encryption parameter 
introduced by the SCADA operator through the dedicated 
interface (aka MTU screen). The later aims at supporting the 
key management service which is represented by the key 
management unit artefact. It has the right of a type 
in, out, in/out on the key set MTU, key set 
S1 and key set sto1 data objects (Table I).  
TABLE I. PERMISSIVE POLICY FOR ATTRIBUTES’ NAME AND ATTRIBUTES’ ID 
Attribute Name Attribute’s ID 
Master artefact Organizational service 
Salve artefact Data objects 
Master component Key management unit 
Slave component key set MTU, key set 
S1 and key set sto1 
Permission rules In/Out/In-Out 
Permission conditions  of set of Master- 
Slave Associations  
Master permission cardinality 1 
Slave permission cardinality 1..n 
Cognitive constraints Key exchange values 
This policy is a permissive policy provided that it gives 
an authorization. The second family of policies depicted 
through the RTU-MTU model concerns the application 
layer policies named MTU S1, RTU S1 and RTU 
Sto1. These policies are directly assigned and dictate the 
expected behavior of the application function (in this case, 
the selection of the encryption ID and system). These 
policies correspond to Cognitive. They express that 1 of the 
MTU S1, RTU S1 or RTU sto1 policy (master 
artefact) may Select key Encryption ID, May 
enforce Key Encryption ID and Algorithm 
[32] related to the application MTU S1, RTU S1 and RTU 
sto1 (slave artefact) if there exist at least one permission 
of a type Comp.-capa.-Limit, trans.-rate, 
real-ti.-proc. To process the above Cognitive 
policies, the MTU S1, RTU S1 and RTU Sto1 policies 
required to collect information related to the key by directly 
accessing the respective key set data object artefact, to 
know: Key Set MTU, Key Set S1 and Key Set 
Sto1. This collection of information is possible if the 
appropriate permissive policies are defined and deployed in 
the SCADA. For the sake of clarity, the later have not been 
represented in the MTU-RTU model (Table II). 
TABLE II. COGNITIVE POLICY ATTRIBUTES’ NAME AND ATTRIBUTES’ ID 
Attribute Name Attribute ID 
Master artefact Application service 
Slave artefact Application 
Master component Policy MTU S1, Policy RTU S1, 
Policy RTU Sto1 
Slave component MTU S1, RTU S1, RTU Sto1 
Permission rules Select key Encryption ID – 












Cognitive constraints  of Technical MTU S1,  
RTU S1, STU Sto1. 
V. EVALUATION 
Although the MTU S1 and RTU S1 are SCADA 
artefacts from the same SCADA (crude oil supply SCADA), 
RTU Sto1 is an artefact from another function, i.e.,: crude 
oil storage and distribution. The later consists in an 
alternative SCADA system. Using the ArchiMate® 
metamodel for modelling SCADA policies of a type 
cognitive or permissive at both the organizational and the 
technical layers has allowed representing heterogeneous 
SCADA policies from two different SCADA using the same 
language (i.e.,: ArchiMate® for SCADA systems). 
 
Figure 2.  MTU-RTU Key distribution case. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURES WORKS 
The paper proposes an integrated approach for modelling 
the SCADA based on the enterprise architecture modelling 
language and more specially ArchiMate® which has been 
particularly tailored for SCADA systems [23][24][25][26]. 
Based on a dedicated metamodel, the paper has 
demonstrated how technical, application and organization 
policies could be designed and metamodeled, especially 
regarding the policy management for interconnected 
SCADA systems for two of its functions. All along the 
modelling of the SCADA model and the definition of the 
policies according to these models, we have illustrated the 
theory with a business case study related to the petroleum 
supply chain, and more specially the specific functions of 
crude oil supply and crude oil storage and distribution. The 
main future works consists in elaborating a concrete 
prototype to sustain the metamodel usage and the 
deployment in real usage settings. The metamodel drawback 
concerns the lack of a dedicated specialization of the 
ArchiMate language. This extension of the framework 
would highly enrich the decision making mechanism in CI. 
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